Introduction
The role of social capital in the economy has attracted widespread attention (for instance, Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000, and the World Bank Social Capital Initiative, working paper series). The work spans many areas, including economic growth and development (for instance, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993, Knack and Keefer 1997) , inter-firm linkages (for instance, Durlauf 1993, Fafchamps and Minten 1999) , and the labour market (for instance, Granovetter 1995 Granovetter [1974 ), Montgomery 1991) .
A distinction can be drawn between the operation of social capital through social networks and through social norms. The term social capital -with its connotation of current sacrifice for future gain -is not necessarily appropriate in either case. According to Arrow (2000, pp. 3-5) "… the essence of social networks is that they are built up for reasons other than their economic value to the participants… that much of the reward for social interactions is intrinsic…."
1 Similarly, the behaviour that generates such social norms as trust, reciprocity and co-operation need not be interpreted as the outcome of investment decisions. Nevertheless, the term social capital is often used, implying that social networks or social norms are economically valuable assets. We shall follow the practice.
Our interest is in the role of social capital in the Chinese labour market.
China provides an excellent case study. First, an important aspect of Chinese societywhether in traditional China (-1949) , in the period of central planning , or in the period of economic reform (1978-) -is the Chinese variant of social capital known as guanxi. The social relationships that constitute guanxi are pervasive in both economic and non-economic life. Is guanxi important for success in the labour market? Second, the Chinese urban labour market is in a process of transition from an administered system, in which labour was allocated and wages were set institutionally, to one in which market forces play a role. In principle, guanxi can be used in either system. Is guanxi more or less important in the more competitive parts of the labour market?
The economic literature is divided between those who model social capital at the community level (for instance, Knack and Keefer 1997 , Narayan and Pritchard 1999 , Dasgupta 2000 and those who do so at the individual or household level. The latter approach is adopted here: we analyse the effects of social capital acquisition by individuals, whether motivated by social or economic considerations. The main contributions are twofold: our measures of social capital, and the comparative analysis of social capital in different labour market environments.
Section 2 draws on the relevant literature, both in general and on China, in order to develop hypotheses about the effects of social capital in the labour market. Section 3 explains our data set and provides the framework for testing. In Section 4 we present and interpret the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Context and Hypotheses
The notion that social institutions can address labour market failure has been investigated in the contexts of imperfect information and transaction costs. Various beneficial effects in the labour market have been attributed to social capital. Among them is better information (Granovetter 1995 (Granovetter [1974 , Waldinger 1996) , decreased transaction costs (Abraham and Medoff 1983, Eccles and Crane 1988) , increased efficiency (Burt 1992), or improved trust and other normative values (Akerlof 1982) . Montgomery (1991) develops an adverse selection model in which a referral system using the contacts of current employees results in higher profits for the firm as well as in higher wages for the employees who have the requisite social contacts to make referrals. Social networks may thus assist job search and promotions and give rise to earnings premiums. Moreover, there is empirical evidence to support the arguments that social capital is valuable. Studies in the United
States show the importance of referrals in recruitment (Granovetter 1995 [1974 ], Waldinger 1996 , and of associational affiliation (Bartlett and Miller 1985) or contacts (Mortensen and Vishwanath 1994) in raising wages.
Social capital and in particular guanxi -the relationships that an individual maintains in social networks -have been emphasised in the analysis of Chinese economic transactions (for instance, Bian 1994a, Wank 1995) as well as social life (for instance, Kipnis 1997 , Yang 1994 , Yan 1996 . Oi (1999, p. 132) regards guanxi as the "operational code" for how best to get things done in China. The traditional strength of guanxi may stem from the lack of a comprehensive legal structure (McMillan 1995) , and its more recent economic importance may be due to the inconsistent enforcement of laws (Yang 1994; Lee 1998) , risk reduction in an uncertain socio-politico-economic environment (Walder 1986 , Oi 1989 , 1999 , risk spreading in an economy characterised by shortages (Yan 1994 , Kipnis 1997 , Chang 1999 , and information sharing in imperfect markets (Knight and Song 1999) . Meals and gifts are common and effective methods of cultivating guanxi (Yan 1996 , Kipnis 1997 , Oi 1999 . The associated gift economy is prevalent in both urban and rural China (Yang 1994) .
Turning specifically to the Chinese labour market: Bian (1994a) argues that guanxi was a determinant of employment success in the system of allocated jobs. In a case study over half of the state sector workers who were allocated their first job had used guanxi to help obtain the assignment; according to Bian (1994b) , half of another sample of state sector workers who had changed jobs had used a contact to do so; Oi (1989) finds that contacts are important in hiring; Lee (1998) concludes that managers use referrals from current employees to generate goodwill and to reduce the chance of hiring undesirable workers. Knight and Song (1999) argue that the use of contacts improves the information of both recruiting firms and searching workers in an imperfect labour market. Guanxi can also raise earnings. Promotions and pay rises can depend on inside information and connections (Bian 1994a, Lee 1998).
The Chinese Communist Party has complete control of the organs of state in China, and the Party also reaches down to the lower levels of social organisation. There is a Party secretary in each village and a Party organisation in each work unit. Membership of the Party is not simply a matter of personal choice: recruits are vetted and selected.
Membership involves acceptance of Party discipline but it may also provide information, contacts and influence. The positive relationship between Party membership and income is well known, although the direction of causation needs to be established (Knight and Song 1991, 1993) . Party membership is thus a promising indicator of associational social capital in China.
Our basic hypothesis is that guanxi generates returns in the urban labour market. We shall use three measures of social capital -the size of a worker's social network, the worker's associational membership of the Communist Party, and the Communist Party membership of the worker's parents -as our measures of social capital.
Given support for the basic hypothesis, we go on to analyse the returns to guanxi in different parts of the labour market. In principle, guanxi can be important in either an administered system involving labour allocation and institutional wage determination or in a market-oriented system. In the former, guanxi may provide access to economic rents, and in the latter, guanxi may provide information and reduce transaction costs.
Three stratifications of the labour market will be analysed. Since 1995, the Chinese government has pursued a policy of reforming the state-owned enterprise sector.
This has involved the retrenchment of over 25 million employees (Appleton et al., 2002) .
We contrast workers who have been retrenched -and who are thus more likely to have faced market forces as they searched for jobs -and those who have never been retrenched.
We contrast age cohorts: the younger age cohorts are more likely to have encountered a labour market whereas the older cohorts generally continue to work in allocated jobs.
Finally, we investigate whether returns to social capital differ by ownership sector, as state enterprises and urban collectives are associated with the administered labour system whereas private firms and the self-employed are more subject to labour market forces.
Data
The data set we use to test our hypotheses is an urban household survey 1991, 1993) . This measure of social capital accords with the notion of associational membership as proposed by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) . Associational membership is often used in aggregative form to proxy the level of social capital in the community, rather than as an individual investment decision. Given the importance of the Communist Party in China's society and its power structure, the access to influence which it provides makes membership the most promising indicator of associational social capital.
We also consider the role of parents' Communist Party membership as a form of guanxi from which children can benefit at a formative stage of their careers. We estimate the determinants of both social network and Party membership to gain a better understanding of these variables (Table 2 ). Equation (1) is an OLS regression of the determinants of social network, while equation (2) 
Empirical investigation
Our analysis begins with estimating the determinants of income for the entire urban sample. Later we partition the sample into different segments that accord with our hypotheses concerning the role of social capital in the administered versus the market- evaluated at the 5% level of significance. We report all estimates in the tables for the whole sample. For brevity, we report only the pertinent estimates for the remaining tables.
In Table 3 , we estimate the determinants of income for the entire urban sample of employed individuals. Compare the most appropriate equations without (equation (2)) and with (equation (5)) the social network variable. We choose these because the inverse Mills ratio is significant in equation (2) and social networks are found to be endogenous. In equation (2), regarding productive characteristics, there is a 4.9% return to each year of education and a 2.1% return to each year of employment experience at the mean value of employment experience. There is a large gender earnings gap: women are paid 18% less than men. We also control for the ownership sector of the employer and occupation, but focus our discussion on the human capital and social capital variables.
In equation (5), social network is found to generate a positive income premium of 10% and is significant at the 10% level. The returns to education fall from 4.9% to 2.5% per annum. Returns to employment experience likewise fall to 1.6% per annum.
Interestingly, the gender gap falls to 12%. Our findings suggest that there is correlation between social network and the human capital and gender variables. When it is omitted, the returns to gender, education and experience are overstated. For instance, part of the gender gap can be attributed to differences in social network.
In equation (7), there is a 13% income premium associated with Communist
Party membership, which is significant at the 1% level. The human capital and the gender coefficients remain largely unaffected by its inclusion. When both social network and Communist Party membership are introduced, in equation (10), we find an approximate 10% income premium associated respectively with each variable.
We conclude from Table 3 that our basic hypothesis is supported. There are indeed significant and substantial returns to both of our social capital variables, social network and Communist Party membership. Moreover, the social network and the other personal variables are correlated. Thus, part of the gender gap may arise from gender differences in social networks. Insofar as the correlation between education and social network is non-causal, one more member in a social network is worth more than one more year of education; insofar as education expands a social network, the latter coefficient indicates a mechanism by which education raises pay. (2) that having both parents who are (or were) Party members has a substantial and significant effect on earnings, and one which is larger than having only one parent a member. 4 When social network is also introduced (equation (5)) parental membership, although positive, ceases to be significant. Similarly, when all the social capital variables are included and the endogenous variable, social network, is instrumented, the coefficients on social network and Party membership remain substantial and significant but the parental Party membership variables, although positive, become insignificant (equation (10)). The returns to social network and to human capital from Table 3 are not affected by the guanxi of an individual's parents. In the overall sample, then, the social capital provided by parents is not beneficial. to be in the more institutional part of the labour market and the latter likely to have encountered market forces. There is indeed a contrast: although the coefficients on the social capital variables are of similar size for these two groups, they are generally significant for workers who had never been retrenched and not significant for those who had been (equations (5) and (10)). We can therefore be more confident that social capital is valuable for unretrenched workers. For the unretrenched, the human capital variables are rewarded.
They are reduced by the inclusion of the social capital variables but remain significant (equations (6) and (10)). The results for this (predominant) group are very similar to those for the sample as a whole (Table 3) . Both human and social capital are valuable in that part of the labour market more closely associated with the planned rather than the market economy.
Even in the absence of social capital, the returns to education and employment experience are lower and the gender gap larger for the retrenched than for the unretrenched (equations (1) and (6)). With the inclusion of social capital, the gender gap remains large and significant (women are paid 20% less than men, ceteris paribus), but the returns to human capital are insignificant. It appears that neither human nor social capital is valuable for the retrenched workers. Many of them were flung onto a tough, unwelcoming labour market in which jobs which would match their skills, and jobs with which their networks could help them, were very scarce. probably entered the labour force during the 1990s, when the allocation system had broken down or weakened and entrants generally had to search for their own jobs in the emerging labour market.
We find that social network does not benefit the oldest age cohort, whereas
Party membership, and even parental Party membership, does. Indeed, the parental variable is only significant for the oldest cohort. It appears that parental Party membership was important in securing a favourable job allocation under central planning, and that own Party membership assisted the subsequent careers of the oldest cohort. Social network is significant for the youngest and middle cohorts, but the coefficient is lower for the former.
For labour market entrants, parental social network (not measured in the survey) may be more important than own social network. Finally, the coefficient on own Party membership is positive, significant, and more or less the same for all three cohorts.
Four ownership sectors are distinguished in Table 7 . The most important category, accounting for 76% of employees, is the state sector, followed by urban collectives (14%), private firms (7%) and the self-employed (3%). The recent reforms have given greater managerial autonomy to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including a degree of freedom to manage workers. Nevertheless, the ownership sector is the one least affected by labour market forces. The difference between SOEs and urban collectives is not large, except that collectives are more likely to face 'hard' budgets. Labour market forces are most likely to be experienced in the private sector. The self-employment sector is also subject to market forces, but the nature and role of social capital is probably different for the self-employed.
Indeed, we see in Table 7 that social capital does not assist the self- (4), (6) and (10)). It appears that social capital is important in both the administered and the market-oriented parts of the labour market, but it is more important in the more market-oriented part.
It is worth pointing out an unexpected result. Whereas the returns to employment experience are highest in the private sector, the returns to education are lowest there, and the inclusion of the social capital variables reduces them to zero (equations (9) and (10)). This does not fit the argument that, given the egalitarianism of the state sector, the rewards for human capital, including education, should be higher in the more marketoriented, private sector. But, it does suggest that those better able to enter the private sector have experience that is sought by new private firms which in turn reward these workers for the contacts and connections that are valuable in an uncertain market.
Conclusion
Our main objective in this paper was to discover whether social capital plays a role in the urban labour market in China. We found persuasive evidence in support of our basic hypothesis. Both our measure of social network and our measure of associational social capital, Communist Party membership, raise the incomes of employed persons. Social capital appears to be important by comparison with human capital.
Remarkably, one additional reported contact contributes more to earned income than an additional year of schooling! It is possible that our measures are correlated with unobserved personal characteristics, such as sociability. However, it is likely that such personal characteristics enhance income through their effects in expanding social networks and encouraging associational memberships. Thus networks and memberships play an economic role -which accords with the findings of others who have investigated social networks and reached a similar conclusion (for instance, see Granovetter 1995 Granovetter [1974 and Rebick 2000).
Our secondary objective was to understand the mechanisms by which social capital has its effects. We saw a potential role for it both in an administered labour system, where jobs are allocated and wages are institutionally determined, and in a market-oriented system -especially an underdeveloped one -where labour market information is poor and transaction costs are high. Our results were rather mixed. Our measure of network is more important for the middle than for the youngest or the oldest age cohorts, possibly because the forms of social capital relevant to the other two groups are different: parental Communist Party membership was important under central planning and parental social networks may be important for labour market entrants. Social capital is more valuable for the majority of workers who have never been retrenched than for the minority who have recently been.
The latter appear to be in a tough labour market in which jobs which match their skills, or for which their social networks can help, are very scarce. Social networks appear to be more beneficial in the private sector than in the state or urban collective sectors. Since this is the rapidly expanding sector, the expectation must be that guanxi will continue to play an important role in the Chinese labour market.
This paper makes a contribution to the literature on social capital, both for (1) Omitted dummy variables are: male, non-Communist Party members, not head of household, works in urban collectives, unskilled worker, whose parents are not Communist Party members, whose father is an unskilled worker, and Pinliang.
(2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.
(3) Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust adjusted for clustering at the household level are computed. 
Source: Urban Household Survey, 1999. Notes: (1) Omitted dummy variables are: non-Communist Party members, urban collective sector, unskilled workers, and Pingliang. (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. (3) Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust adjusted for clustering at the household level are computed. (4) The exclusion restriction for equations (2), (4), (7), and (9) is whether childcare is available in the home. It is a dummy variable that equals one if there are grandparents who are living in the household and a child under the age of 17. The variable is equal to zero if there is a child in the household and not grandparents or if there are not children in the household. 
Source: Urban Household Survey, 1999. Notes: (1) Omitted dummy variables are: non-Communist Party members, urban collectives, unskilled workers, and Pingliang.
(3) Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust adjusted for clustering at the household level are computed.
(4) The exclusion restriction for equations (1) and (4) is whether the individual owns his home. The variable is equal to one and zero if otherwise. It is thought to capture individual economic motivation or drive are able to negotiate the purchase of their homes after housing allocation ceased to be part of the in-kind benefits of state sector employment. For equations (6) and (9), it is having childcare in the home. (5) The instrument for social networks is an attitudinal question that asked: "Has the importance of political status, which influence household income, changed compared with before?" Answers were (1) decreased; (2) unchanged; (3) increased. The instrument for Communist Party membership is based on the following question: "Do you hope your children will join the Communist Party?" Answers were (1) no; (2) little; (3) some; (4) very much. A dummy variable equals zero if the answer was either (1) or (2) and equals one otherwise. Social networks are endogenous while Communist Party membership is not endogenous. (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. (3) Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust adjusted for clustering at the household level are computed. (4) The exclusion restriction is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual is in poor health. (5) The instrument for social networks is an attitudinal question that asked: "Has the importance of political status, which influence household income, changed compared with before?" Answers were (1) decreased; (2) unchanged; (3) increased. For the second age cohort, the instrument for social networks was the question: "Have the importance of social connections, which is thought to influence household income, changed as compared with before?" Answers were (1) decreased; (2) unchanged; (3) increased.
The instrument for Communist Party membership is a dummy variable that equals zero if an individual's father is/was an unskilled worker and equals one otherwise. For the first age cohort, the instrument for Communist Party membership is the question: "Do you hope your children will join the Communist Party?" Answers were (1) no; (2) little; (3) some; (4) very much. Social networks are endogenous, while Communist Party membership is not endogenous in the third age cohort and was not endogenous at the 5% level for the other age cohorts. (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.
